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Did all SSA economies have a bad record throughout the 1970s?
No. The decade can be divided pretty clearly into two periods. Over
1970-75, SSA as a region had growth rates below the LDC average. Over
1976-79 the SSA average (at about 6?) was above the LDC average. Over
the decade as a whole, the SSA average was below the LDC average.
Within SSA results varied widely. There were countries of chronically 
poor economic performance, e.g. Ghana, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Madagascar, 
Zaire. Other countries stagnated, e.g. Senegal, Benin, Upper Volta.
Civil war, external intervention and domestic strife lowered growth rates 
(or caused absolute declines) in Uganda, Chad, Rhodesia (as it then was), 
Angola, Mozambique, Central African Republic. Very poor mineral prices 
from 1975 onwards hit several economies very hard, notably those of 
Mauritania and Zambia. However, many countries maintained over most of 
the decade growth rates of 52 or above, e.g. Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania.
The main cause of ecomomic success cannot be uniformly ascribed either to 
the availability of resources, nor to the chosen economic strategy.
Policies on such issues as distribution, rural/urban balance, the role of
state enterprise, etc. varied widely. However, all the successes sought 
to achieve or to maintain above-the-11 ne budgetary balances and to avoid 
severely overvalued exchange rates.
Why, at least since 1979, have results been almost uniformly bad? 
Have SSA governments grossly mishandled their responses to recession?
Of all regions, SSA has been hit hardest by the 1979-33 recession.
Deterioration in terms of trade of the order of 33? to 50? between 1976
and 1982 have been common. A majority of countries have also suffered 
from severe droughts.
Many of those conditions prevailed in 1973—7  ^ as well. What was notable 
then was the speed and relative success of a large number of SSA 
adjustment programmes leading to good performances between 1976 and 1979*
The SSA experience between 1979 and 1983 has been very different for a 
number of reasons. First, governments believed 1979-80 would have an 
impact on the global economy like 1973-74 - a sharp shock, a short slump 
and a rapid recovery. (They read the OECD, IMF, IBRD studies of the day 
which predicted exactly that and prepared their responses accordingly.) 
In the event this was unwise - there was no global recovery until 1983 
and its impact has still barely affected the real price of most SSA 
exports.
Second, there was no parallel to the Oil Facility and other fairly 
soft/easy method of access to credit made available in 1973-74. This led 
many countries into unwise use of supplier credits and of commercial bank 
loans to bridge what they expected to be a short slump. When the slump 
continued and interest rates (both nominal and real) rose sharply, their 
external debt service positions became unmanageable. In over half the 
cases, substantial commercial payments arrears built up despite sharp (in 
many cases 25% or more) cuts in import volume.
Third, the unexpectedly long duration of the slump, and, cuts, in imports 
forced by limited credit availability combined with rising debt service 
costs, eroded government revenue bases. Despite real cuts on spending 
under most heads, recurrent budget deficits became chronic even in states 
like Malawi and Tanzania which had previously had above-the-line 
surpluses. These deficits interacted with the terms of trade 
deterioration to produce far more significant currency overvaluations 
than had been experienced previously.
Why has public sector capacity to act declined so sharply?
The simple answer is lack of resources. For example in Zambia rural 
health services usually lack fuel and spares for vehicles, drugs and food 
for patients, equipment and kerosine for clinics. Extension services in 
several countries cannot sensibly advise use of fertilizer, insecticide 
or improved seed because none of these is available.
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In some countries - notably but not exclusively the poorer Francophone
ones - civil servants and municipal employees are commonly paid up to
three months in arrears. Nearly everywhere attempts to regain budgetary 
balance have reduced the purchasing power of government employees’ pay 
draconlcally. e.g. in Uganda a clerk or labourer’s monthly pay will 
barely buy one week’s staple food for his family; in Zaire a secretary's
salary will just about cover the cost of going to and from work.
In other countries, as the result of two decades of intensive training 
backed by substantial external support, competent personnel especially in 
health and education are available. Unfortunately lack of adequate 
government revenue or import capacity means that drugs, textbooks, 
kerosine for fridges, desks and chairs, paper and pencils, beds and
medical equipment, vehicles and fuel cannot be provided in adequate 
quantities for the personnel to function properly. e.g., Recently only 
an emergency foreign grant averted the total absence of drugs in the main 
Swaziland hospital at Mbabane.
Have SSA states overexpanded their public sectors?
Sometimes but not always. On average SSA government budgets - with the 
exception of social security and related transfer payments - are about 
the same per cent of GDP as in other areas of the world. Nor is there a 
marked average difference in their makeup by type of spending. Social 
security and related transfer payments are the lowest of any region,
e.g. in Tanzania government pensions, national provident fund and 
maizemeal subsidies - the main social security and related transfer 
payment items - are about 21» of GDP.
SSA public enterprise investments vary widely in operating efficiency and 
profitability. Few generalisations can be made safely even within 
countries. Public enterprises dealing with food procurement and
distribution (in most cases, the lineal descendants of colonial boards) 
are relatively high cost and limited in their ability to distribute
throughout the country. But these failings also characterize most 
private and co-operative enterprises dealing with food production and
distribution.
In two senses the public sector is overextended. First, the present 
eroded revenue base does not allow full operation of what capacity 
exists. In cases such as health, education, water, transport where the 
need is clearly for more, not less, services for economic as well as 
humane reasons, the cure lies primarily in restoring the revenue base. 
For states (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria) not facing significant external threats 
some cutbacks in defence spending may well be appropriate.
Second, given the limited financial and personnel resources, greater 
selectivity in determining what to do would seem necessary. In most 
cases the actual choice is not between whether a service is provided 
publicly or privately; it is between whether it is provided publicly or 
not at all. In present circumstances, a more limited range of functions 
carried out better would usually be desirable.
How much of SSA's failure to respond effectively flows from bad 
economic management?
This varies widely from country to country. Just as the 1970's economic 
performance record was very uneven so also was the quality of economic 
management. In every country some policy mistakes and a greater number 
of weaknesses in implementation and management can be cited. However, it 
is not convincing to argue that economic management suddenly became worse 
as of 1979.
What clearly did happen was that it became less able to produce desired 
results. That, however, was true in all regions - not excluding OECD - 
over 1979-82. The failure was more pronounced in SSA because the 
external shocks were greater both relative to the physical and financial 
capacity to respond and to the ability of economic management to tackle 
harder problems.
Failure to achieve results - for whatever reasons - is bad for morale. 
When repeated failures accumulate over several years, individual and 
institutional managerial capacities are eroded. That process has 
occurred already in several states which performed badly in the 1970's;
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there Is a real danger that it will occur tn several more if the problems 
which have overwhelmed many SSA countries in the past five years remain 
unresolved.
Have Francophone countries done better economically?
Probably not. If one pairs roughly comparable Francophone and Anglophone 
economies and looks at a range of indicators, e.g. past and present 
growth rates, external balance, external debt burden and adequacy of 
public services, it is possible to reach an opposite conclusion. Much 
depends on which indicators of economic performance are chosen.
Botswana has a better record than Gabon. Cameroon has performed better 
than Nigeria. Kenya has done somewhat better than the Ivory Coast 
(especially taking into account the latter*s appalling external debt 
position). While both Sierra Leone and Guinea have been consistently 
unsuccessful economically, the Guinean record is worse. Senegal - 
despite near stagnation for most of two decades - has done less badly
i
, than Ghana. Malawi has outperformed Mali by a substantial margin and
Tanzania has a much better record than the Malagasy Republic.
What is evident is that the majority of Francophone African states have 
usually avoided recurrent budget deficits, open import controls and - 
less markedly - sustained high rates of inflation. The reason for this - 
and their typically higher external debt service burden - lies in the 
monetary and exchange rate system which members of the franc zone
operate.
What is special about the Francophone West African, Central African,
Mall and Malagasy central banks?
These are operated for the two groups of states, as well as for Mali and 
Madagascar, on the lines of the last phase of the 3ritish Colonial 
Currency Boards. They have strict limits on fiduciary issues and are
basically French-run in terms of policy. Change of currency parities 
against the French franc (or each other) .is only permitted exceptionally. 
Nor is exchange control against France allowed. The French leverage is
exerted partly through the provision of French personnel but even more 
through the provision of French Treasury Funds to cover approved state 
and external balance deficits.
This framework does prevent access to the printing press for the finance 
of government deficits; it also prevents devaluation as a cure for 
overvaluation. As a result it leads to smaller government spending (or 
to non-payment of bills including wages and salaries) and to somewhat 
greater price stability. It has also led to far greater use of short and 
medium term external commercial credit (£3>500 million in debt repayment 
requirement for the Ivory Coast over 1984-88) and to heavier taxation of 
agricultural exports - neither of which features can be considered 
evidence of a satisfactory strategy on broader economic grounds.
/
Does the greater number of middle-level Europeans and old colonial 
hands benefit Francophone African states?
Yes and no. The greater numbers of mechanics, secondary school teachers, 
hairdressers and foremen are the counterpart to less training 
especially less technical and vocational training. That seems to be a 
weakness of Francophone Africa and of France’s form of development 
cooperation which is in contrast to Commonwealth Africa’s relative 
success in training and the strong cooperation it has received from the 
UK.
Commonwealth African governments may at times have been too eager to 
localise jobs, but on balance it is doubtful that the quality of their 
basic line officers is now lower than that of Francophone states with 
their larger numbers of former colonial civil servants. Part of the 
difference is terminological. Anglophone states use more specialist 
consultants and technical assistance personnel from a variety of sources 
and tend to call such people advisors even when they are doing standard 
civil service work.
A real difference does exist in respect to the staffing of Treasuries and 
Central Banks. But the effect upon policy and administration appear to 
be as much the result of maintaining fixed Franc zone parities, to the
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absence of exchange controls, to the limitation of Fiduciary issues and 
to the operation of the French Treasury special account as to the actual 
nationality of the personnel employed.
Do many SSA economies have serious external debt problems or Is It 
only a handful, such as Zaire, Sudan, Nigeria, Ivory Coast?
Most SSA economies have very severe external debt and debt service 
problems. Only Botswana and the Cameroon can be said unambiguously to 
combine viable medium term import capacity, sound external balance 
parameters, and comfortable debt service ratios. Gabon may soon reach 
that position but only after five years of internal recession to overcome 
its external debt crisis.
Zaire, the Sudan, Nigeria and now the Ivory Coast are the best known 
cases because they are absolutely the largest. Smaller countries debts 
whose debt-servicing costs now require 25-50$ of export earnings are
equally weighed down. But the absolute size of the debt is not large
enough to attract the attention of the international financial community.
Further, SSA external debts include very high proportions of very short 
term credits (i.e. under one year), commercial arrears and IMF drawings 
which do not figure in the World Bank's debt statistics but do need to be 
serviced. Taking these into account, the typical African economy has a 
debt service ratio of 35-40$ of export earnings. Even countries like 
Zimbabwe which had limited debt in 1980, which have borrowed only for
priority capital projects, and which have sought to maximize soft and
long term finance, have debt service ratios which are already over 30$ 
and likely to rise.
How much would rescheduling help?
Rescheduling by itself will not help much in the more acute cases - at 
least not unless the period and terms are to be significantly different 
from current London and Paris Club models.
To be able to service debt African countries must increase exports. To
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do so they need to avoid economic collapse and to invest in the 
production of exportable goods and in the necessary supporting 
infrastructure. This means more imports for specific investments, more 
imports to keep the economies going and, more imports to maintain or 
rehabilitate the existing capital stock. Import cuts in many economies 
are now starving the export sector of materials and spare parts and 
debilitating processing and transport capacity.
Two or three year roll-forward debt rescheduling exercises cannot provide 
all of the foreign exhange needed to rehabilitate or expand exports to 
the extent necessary to enable the debt eventually to be re-paid. Both 
new lending (public and/or private) and interim balance of payments 
support funding are needed too. More useful than repetitive one or two 
year capital payment reschedulings would be a number of packages 
combining 3 to 5 year capital payment deferral with aid and selective new 
lending.
In some cases - e.g. Zaire, Sudan - it is clear that the full amount lent 
can never be recovered. An analogy to the reconstruction of company debt 
should apply here - it would be better to write off some of the debt (or 
to achieve the same result by turning it into longer term, low interest 
obligations) in order to allow a practicable programme for servicing the 
rest.
Isn't it vital for SSA economies to export more?
Yes. Many are now covering only 50 to 60% of their imports from export 
earnings. Worse, this is being achieved at import levels which have been 
cut so much that these economies, including their export sectors, cannot 
function properly. The need to raise export earnings could not be 
clearer.
Part of the problem is the fall in the real prices of many exports. This 
has both reduced earnings on present volumes and acted as a disincentive 
to expansion. But SSA economies can do little about this on their own, 
and the OECD recovery has not yet caused much improvement - especially to 
prices for minerals.
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Therefore either the volume of present exports must be raised or new ones 
developed. But which exports? To that question there are no easy, 
general answers - except wrong ones. If all SSA economies were to raise 
coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco and cotton exports 5 to 8% a year, the price 
elasticities and their combined share of world trade in these products 
are such they they would earn less, not more foreign exchange. Africa is 
not, in general, a low labour cost area; very few countries can mount 
labour-intensive, export zone type programmes with any prospect of 
success.
Some specific answers can be given:- Ghana needs to rehabilitate cocoa, 
Uganda tea, the Sudan cotton and Senegal groundnuts. Zimbabwe should 
rehabilitate and expand ferrochrcme production. New natural resource 
based products with reasonable market prospects should receive priority 
attention. But these approaches need to be worked out case by case. 
They require both time and finance to implement. All they could provide 
would be a start to the rebuilding of current account positions.
Why is SSA agriculture performing so badly?
Several reasons. A very important reason - especially for export crops - 
is price. Overvalued exchange rates and falling real prices 
internationally do not encourage output. Where food imports are not 
restricted by taxes, licenses or lack of foreign exchange similar 
considerations apply to grain production competing with imports, but such 
cases are in a distinct minority. For food crops more generally evidence 
suggests that price may not usually be the main problem. Food prices 
have risen faster than either wages or the cost of living in most African 
economies since 1979* Where this is not the position in respect of 
official prices, peasants often sell on parallel markets and so do 
benefit from the higher prices.
A second reason is the general economic situation. Agricultural inputs - 
even hoes - are in scarce supply because of decreased import capacity. 
The general economic situation is also causing processing and transport 
capacity to break down and has the effect of depriving food producers of
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the domestic manufactures and other goods that would serve as an
incentive for them to bring their produce to the market.
A third reason is the lack of basic health, water and education in many
rural areas. This provides a very strong disincentive to staying on the
farm. The more ambitious leave for the urban areas, where such services 
are better. Of those who stay, it may be observed that peasants who are 
often ill or illiterate or both and who often have to spend much of their 
time walking many miles to get wood and water are not likely to be very 
productive.
A fourth reason is the overemphasis on large mechanized farms, and on 
large scale centrally organized irrigation schemes - an overemphasis 
still promoted by many external bodies. Mechanized agriculture in Africa 
- at least for staple food production - requires skilled management, 
fuel, and capital and is therefore import intensive. It often yields a 
poor return on capital employed even when - as in Zimbabwe - it is 
technically efficient. The same is usually true of large scale, 
centrally run irrigation schemes - as in Senegal, Mali, Northern Nigeria 
(Sudan and Kenya are partial exceptions). These divert government 
expertise, personnel and funds away from addressing the cental problems 
of peasant agriculture.
Finally, - in contrast to South and Southeast Asia - SSA has benefited 
very little from research and technology development tested in the field 
for economic viability and peasant useability. Extension services are 
weak and peasants are cautious in resisting innovations (rightly so as 
their lives are at stake and much past advice has been wrong). 3ut the 
basic problem is lack of known, tested knowledge on how output can be 
raised within specific ecological, labour, input and capital constraints. 
More attention from the International Crops Research Institutes 
(especially ICRISAT), more coordinated regional work (as in SADCC on 
sorghum, millet and grain legumes) and more carefully planned programmes 
are needed, especially for food crops. This is an area in which external 
initiatives and support are both necessary and likely to be welcomed.
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Do not SSA economies urgently need 'to-get the prices right'?
Certainly. Present exchange rates (foreign exchange prices), grower 
prices and price controls are often unrealistic and counter-productive. 
But, given the prevailing situations, price corrections often can be made 
only in conjunction with other measures.
If prevailing staple grain prices are only half what growers need to 
break even, such prices cannot be adjusted overnight with no other 
action. Either there will be reactions by workers (whether riots, 
strikes or absenteeism) imperilling both public order and production; or 
there will need to be compensating - or partially compensating - wage 
increases and/or additional food supplies to reduce ’parallel market’ 
grain prices.
If devaluation is not accompanied by external finance to permit increased 
imports to restore local production ( e.g of simple manufactured goods), 
and the processing and transport of exports, it will usually simply set 
off new inflationary spirals which rapidly cancel out the devaluation's 
initial price correction.
At issue are not simply relative price changes - real wages in many 
African states have fallen 50% since 1979 and except for the Francophone 
states (who have recently floated down with the franc) most have devalued 
at least 30%• Questions of phasing and of the need to take supply 
increasing steps parallel with price corrections are also important. As 
the World Bank pointed out in its 1982 WDR, additional resources are 
necessary not simply to make price corrections compatible with political 
stability but even to allow them the chance of having any lasting 
economic effect.
What about investment?
Further investment is urgent, but not primarily in new capacity. 
Patterns of investment need to be changed every bit as much as relative 
prices.
Key elements of present productive capacity and infrastruture throughout
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SSA are deteriorating for lack of maintenance. Many production units 
have deteriorated so extensively that they require major rehabilitation. 
This should have top priority in gross investment. Investment in new 
capacity will often make no addition to output; it may simply reduce the 
general level of capacity utilisation.
This is partly the responsibility of aid and credit agencies. It is much 
easier to secure funding for a new highway than for rehabilitation of an 
endangered one; it is still more difficult to get finance for the
equipment and training of maintenance units.
Selective new investments to raise production possibilities in respect of 
exports and substitutes for present imports (especially food and energy) 
are needed. But in general much more attention (and external support) 
needs to go to maintenance, rehabilitation and the fuller use of existing 
capital stock.
Shouldn't SSA economies be practising austerity?
Most are. Taking into account population growth and terms of trade
losses, Zambia's per capita use of resources has fallen by nearly 50%
since 1975. Total constant price expenditure on public sevices in
Tanzania (excluding debt service) has been reduced each year since
1979-80 - with a total fall of perhaps 20%. Real civil service wages and 
salaries are down 20% or more since 1979 in a majority of African states. 
Import volume cuts are frequently of the same order of magnitude.
As the IMF has said with regard to the import cuts, this type of 
wholesale austerity is becoming counter productive. At the international 
level it is both a drag on the recovery of world trade and - because it
is eroding exports and making debt service burdens look ever more
unbearable - raises risks of deliberate defaults or - more probably - of 
defaults through 3heer inability to pay. Nationally it is eroding both 
incentives to work hard (by peasants, wage earners, civil servants and 
managers alike) and the capacity to provide minimum critical services 
(e.g. power, water, education, health, agricultural extension). What it 
has not been able to achieve by itself is the freeing of sufficient
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resources either to restore external balance or to end recurrent budget 
deficits. In some countries there is a danger that further cuts will 
merely have the effect of diminishing exports and government revenue yet 
further.
Continued austerity - tempered once real output per capita, government 
revenue and exports begin to recover - is critical. But it will only 
work if more foreign exchange to restore production and government 
revenue is also available. In some cases this may largely require 
altering the balance of external financial flows toward maintenance, 
rehabilitation and operating inputs. In others - as with the 
rehabilitation programmes of major commercial enterprises - more external 
grants and credits will be required if the austerity is to pay off.
Is there a case for more policy dialogue?
Of course, if it really is dialogue. Both donors and African states have 
made mistakes, need to reassess and to revise their programmes, and are 
(or ought to be) unsure what really will work now. There is an urgent 
need to get away from casting blame, making rhetorical generalisations, 
trying to compress very complex and specific problems into one sentence
slogans. Serious policy dialogues aimed at seeing in specific contexts
what the critical problems are, what has been prescribed and attempted in 
the past successfully or unsuccessfully, what actions should and can be 
undertaken now - such dialogues could be very useful.
Preaching and imposing programmes (which is what most SSA governments
currently think invitations to dialogue actually mean) will not be 
useful. First, many of the actions now criticized: e.g. early 1970's 
grain price reductions, emphasis on mechanized agriculture, 
overinvestment in large factories, international airports, etc. were 
advocated and financed by some of todays present most confident critics. 
Second, generalized prescriptions from a long distance rarely correspond 
well to specific realities. Third, imposed programmes may well be 
accepted but usually only after an economy is in a state of nearly 
complete collapse and with a limited commitment to working steadfastly 
for their implementation. These conditions do not augur well for the
- 14 -
success of even the most soundly conceived programmes.
Because the situation in most SSA economies is very serious, because past 
results suggest serious errors in donor and recipient policies and 
analysis, because the present context requires policy changes and because 
specific programme  must relate to actual national contexts (not 
generalisations intended to apply to 30 countries), and because difficult 
policies require genuine national understanding and backing if they are 
to work - dialogue is critical. But it needs to be clear that what is 
intended really is dialogue, in which donors acknowledge that they too 
need to learn more in order to formulate sensible programmes for their 
own actions. Only on that basis is any contribution to the design of 
rehabilitation and recovery programmes for SSA countries likely to prove 
successful.
